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Readers are generally well advised to exercise some caution with books whose 
titles purport that the contents comprise “The Forgotten Tale of . . . ,” “The Lost 
Story of . . . ,” or in this case “The Secret History of. . . .”  It is not unusual for 
readers of such works to soon discover that the intriguing titles are the work of 
the author’s or the publisher’s overactive imagination. That’s not quite the case 
here, but in all fairness to readers, the book is also not exactly what the title 
would lead one to believe.  Reflecting the author’s journalistic background, the 
book is not actually a history of MI6, but a far more selective rendering of stories 
that might enable one to extrapolate more broadly to gain a better sense of the 
history of Britain’s overseas intelligence service, MI6. 
 
Journalist Gordon Corera is security correspondent for the BBC. Educated at 
Oxford and Harvard, Corera hosted a three-part series on BBC Radio in 2009 
entitled “MI6: A Century in the Shadows.”  As a result of that and his years of 
reporting on intelligence matters, Corera had enviable access to some of Britain’s 
top officials in MI6 and participants in some of its more notorious escapades.  
That access clearly informed the contents of his book as well.  The style of the 
book will mostly appeal to those with little familiarity with the topic or with the 
world of intelligence in general, or those simply looking for a good, factual spy 
tale.  The dramatic storytelling style of the book makes for a compelling read, but 
it is not the type of scholarly treatment this subject justly deserves, and it is 
somewhat marred by the author’s limited perspective on the topic. Still, there are 
reasons it’s worth reading, as described below. 
 
The book follows a mostly chronological line stretching from post-World War II 
Vienna to modern day Southwest Asia.  Drawing on interviews and first-hand 
accounts from participants, Corera constructs the tale of MI6 during those years 
by telling the story of the spies and spy masters who played significant roles 
throughout them.  An important sub-theme woven throughout the book is the 
relationship between Britain and its American cousins.  In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, Britain was faced with an unprecedented financial crisis that 
hampered the operational capability of its security services just as the threat of 
Communist domination supplanted that of National Socialism.  It was the 
Americans and the CIA that stepped into the breach, forever changing the 
balance of power between British and U.S. intelligence services just as the war 
had ushered in the decline of the British Empire and the rise of a new American 
superpower.  In Corera’s view, both nations’ intelligence agencies thus shared in 
the successes and failures, the latter marked most prominently by the treachery 
of Kim Philby, which Corera notes highlighted the problems in operations and 
“the whole culture of Anglo-American intelligence” (p. 67). 
 
Corera carefully traces the story of Oleg Penkovsky, one of the most important 
Cold War Russian intelligence officers to spy for the West.  Penkovsky was found 
out, tried, and probably executed by the Soviets in 1963, and it seems clear from 
the tale Corera relates that the case was still marked by the same carelessness and 
bungling that plagued western intelligence at the start of the Cold War era.  The 
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case marked a turning point in MI6’s history.  Remarkably, according to the 
author, it restored confidence within the service and established a new era of 
professionalism for the future.  Given the dreadful mismanagement on the part 
Penkovsky’s handlers and the intelligence agencies involved, this is a rather 
dubious conclusion.  That there was no internal inquiry remarked on, combined 
with the fact that the Penkovsky case enhanced the careers of many of those 
involved, seems to indicate the existence of a far more serious institutional 
weakness in the service.  The information Penkovsky provided allowed MI6 to 
turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse, but a closer examination of the handling of their 
most valuable source raises some serious questions about the service’s 
capabilities at that time. 
 
By the time the author moves on to the post-9/11 era, the story becomes less 
about MI6 per se, and instead about the interplay between Britain’s Joint 
Intelligence Committee, its government on the whole, and the relationship 
between the United States and its closest ally.  That discussion provides the 
context for the events that are illustrated most prominently by the intelligence 
failures leading to the invasion of Iraq.  The impression conveyed is that of an 
MI6 that throughout its history was consistently threatened and insecure, never 
more so than after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the removal of the 
threat of communist domination left the service questioning its relevance.  The 
events after 9/11 “offered delivery from those fears” (p. 364).   
 
It must be recalled that it was widely accepted in U.S. intelligence circles that an 
increasing reliance on technical and electronic intelligence collection methods 
and a decrease in HUMINT capability put us at a disadvantage in Southwest Asia.  
The British view leading up to the invasion of Iraq, however, blamed the fact that 
Iraq had been relegated to the status of a backwater, low-priority target until 9/11 
boosted its importance.  Previously reliable MI6 sources being aggressively 
tasked to provide information about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq 
thus began to over-reach their usual access levels.  That, combined with frantic 
attempts to enhance its role in rapidly unfolding world events, led MI6 leaders to 
elevate unreliable, unproven intelligence straight to Downing Street with little or 
no vetting through the services assessment staff.  Prime Minster Tony Blair’s 
eagerness to partner with the United States and play a co-equal role in a global 
war on terror meant that such shoddily vetted information was being shared in 
ways that were in no way warranted based on its reliability.  Later, many of the 
MI6 sources denied ever having made any of the statements about WMDs that 
were attributed to them and which helped both the United States and Great 
Britain justify the war in the first place. 
 
The book ends with a brief discussion of MI6’s involvement in Libya, but the 
overall theme of foul ups prevails.  The entire impression conveyed in this work is 
that while the history of MI6 can be marked by stories of individual agents’ 
bravery and successes, the service’s reputation as a whole is less stellar.  The 
importance of accurate intelligence, no matter how it is collected, and the 
appropriate analysis and vetting of that information cannot be underestimated in 
terms of its contributions to foreign policy strategy and decision making.  If the 
trend established throughout this book still prevails, Americans and Britons alike 
have good reason to fear that their governments might be making world-
changing decisions on the basis of flawed information or interpretations. 
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While it might not be the final word on the history of MI6 as an organization, 
Gordon Corera has made a unique contribution to the study of that agency and 
the world of intelligence through this useful, thought-provoking, and well-written 
book.  He illustrates the close ties between the United States and Great Britain in 
that area, but perhaps most usefully he documents what can go wrong when 
intelligence agencies and their governments establish too close a relationship, 
and where the collection and dissemination of information is based on desired 
political outcomes rather than practical realities. 
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